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Abstract—Bitcoin network, with the market value of $68 billion as of January 2019, has received much attention from both industry
and the academy. Mining pools, the main components of the Bitcoin network, dominate the computing resources and play essential
roles in network security and performance aspects. Although many existing measurements of the Bitcoin network are available, little is
known about the details of mining pool behaviors (e.g., empty blocks, mining revenue and transaction collection strategies) and their
effects on the Bitcoin end users (e.g., transaction fees, transaction delay and transaction acceptance rate). This paper aims to fill this
gap with a systematic study of mining pools. We traced over 1.56 hundred thousand blocks (including about 257 million historical
transactions) from February 2016 to January 2019 and collected over 120.25 million unconfirmed transactions from March 2018 to
January 2019. Then we conducted a board range of measurements on the pool evolutions, labeled transactions (blocks) as well as
real-time network traffics, and discovered new interesting observations and features. Specifically, our measurements show the
following. 1) A few mining pools entities continuously control most of the computing resources of the Bitcoin network. 2) Mining pools
are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma where mining pools compete to increase their computing resources even though the unit profit of
the computing resource decreases. 3) Mining pools are stuck in a Malthusian trap where there is a stage at which the Bitcoin incentives
are inadequate for feeding the exponential growth of the computing resources. 4) The market price and transaction fees are not
sensitive to the event of halving block rewards. 5) The block interval of empty blocks is significantly lower than the block interval of
non-empty blocks. 6) Feerate plays a dominating role in transaction collection strategy for the top mining pools. Our measurements and
analysis help to understand and improve the Bitcoin network.
Index Terms—Bitcoin Network, Mining Pools, Malthusian Trap, Incentive Mechanism
F
1 INTRODUCTION
B ITCOIN [1] is a decentralized peer to peer (P2P)cryptocurrency that was first proposed by Satoshi
Nakamoto in 2008. Without resorting to any trusted third
party, Bitcoin adapts a cryptographic proof mechanism that
enables anonymous peers to complete transactions through
the P2P network. Blockchain is the core mechanism of the
Bitcoin system. It not only records historical transactions
from Bitcoin clients, but also prevents the Bitcoin network
from double spending attacks [2]. The Bitcoin network par-
ticipants, who maintain and update the ongoing chain of
blocks, are called miners. These miners compete in a mining
race driven by an incentive mechanism [3], [4], where the
one who first solves the Bitcoin cryptographic puzzle [5]
has the right to collect unconfirmed transactions into a new
block, append the new block to the main chain, i.e., the
longest chain of blocks, and gain some BTCs [6] as a mining
reward.
With the popularity of Bitcoin, the cryptographic puzzles
are getting increasingly difficult that ordinary miners cannot
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successfully solve it in ten minutes even though mining
rewards are rewarding (i.e., block rewards of 12.5 BTCs per
block, pricing at $4,020 per BTC as of January 2019) [7]. As a
result, a new mining approach named pooled mining [8] be-
comes popular among miners since year 2010. The approach
requires miner to trust the pool operator. Miners request
mining tasks from the operator and return the computing
results through the Stratum protocol [9]. Once new blocks
are mined, the mining rewards are redistributed to miners
through the reward functions [4]. This approach enables
miners to stabilize mining revenues by sharing market risks
with other miners [3].
Recently, mining pools have become the major comput-
ing resources of the Bitcoin network, and attract researchers
to work on it for three main reasons. First, mining pools
are of great importance to both security and performance
of the Bitcoin network [10], [11], [12]. Different from small
cryptocurrency systems such as Zcash [13] and Bitcoin Gold
[14] that suffered from 51% attacks, the Bitcoin network has
huge computing power such that the 51% attacks require
a huge amount of computing power which is expensive
[15], [16] and therefore economically infeasible. Second,
the competition among mining pools is intense and many
existing works [9], [17], [18] studied these mining behaviors
in the game theory. Third, mining pool’s behavior signifi-
cantly affects the Bitcoin end users since most of the users’
transaction data is processed by the mining pool.
Thus, given the importance of Bitcoin mining pools, we
conduct a systematic study of the Bitcoin network from
a perspective of mining pools, and provides the detailed
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2analysis of the collected data set. In particular, we focus on
the top four mining pools, i.e., AntPool [19], F2Pool [20],
ViaBTC [21] and BTC.com [22]. Our main contributions to
the literature are summarized as follows.
(i) We performed large scale measurements on his-
torical transactions and blocks, covering over 1.56
hundred thousand blocks (including 257 million
historical transactions) from February 25, 2016, to
January 3, 2019. Also, we developed a python tool
for processing and collecting unconfirmed transac-
tions at Bitcoin Full Node’s Mempool, and collected
over 120.25 million unconfirmed transaction from
March 6, 2018, to January 3, 2019. We made both
the python tool and the collected data set publicly
available to the research community [23].
(ii) We conducted a detailed analysis of the collected
data set from a perspective of mining pools, includ-
ing computing power distribution, mining revenue,
transaction delay and transaction collection strategy.
We discovered new observations and features of the
Bitcoin network. For example, we found that mining
pools are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma where
mining pools compete to increase their computing
resources even though the unit profit of the comput-
ing resource decreases. And mining pools are stuck
in a Malthusian trap where there is a stage at which
the Bitcoin incentives are inadequate for feeding
the exponential growth of the computing resources.
Moreover, we dissected mining pool’s behaviors
and found that feerate plays a dominating role in
transaction collection strategy for the top mining
pools. The acceptance rate of the unconfirmed trans-
actions could be around 90 percent on average if its
feerate ranks are in top X , where X is the number
of transactions of the next block. On the converse,
the acceptance rate of the unconfirmed transactions
could be around less than 5 percent if its feerate ranks
are out of top 2×X . Our measurements and analysis
contribute to better understand the Bitcoin network.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides the background of Bitcoin mining pools,
including Bitcoin related terminology, incentive mechanism
and pool mining principles. Section 3 illustrates our mea-
surement setup and describes the collected data set. Section
4 presents a detailed analysis of historical transactions at the
Bitcoin blockchain, including computing power evolution,
computing power distribution, mining revenue and empty
block. Section 5 analyzes the unconfirmed transactions at
Bitcoin Full Node’s Mmepool, including the transaction
delay, transaction acceptance rate and transaction collection
strategy. Section 6 surveys related works on the Bitcoin net-
work measurement. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND OF BITCOIN MINING POOLS
2.1 Terminology
The terminology used in Bitcoin mining pools is not well
standardized. For the purpose of clarity, we listed some
terms of mining pools and define them as follows.
Definition 2.1 (Mining Pool). The mining pool is the
pooling of computing power by coordinating miners via a
specific network protocol. SlushPool, the first mining pool,
was introduced when mining difficulty was getting so hard
that small miners could even take years to solve the mining
difficulty [24].
Definition 2.2 (Hash Rate). The hash rate is the speed of
solving the Bitcoin cryptographic puzzles in the units of
hashes per second. Following the Blockchain website [7],
the hash rate of the Bitcoin network was estimated to be
around 43.29 Ehash/s as of January 3, 2019.
Definition 2.3 (Mining Difficulty). The mining difficulty is
the difficulty of solving the Bitcoin cryptographic puzzles.
To achieve a relatively stable block generation speed, Bitcoin
adapts a term named mining difficulty that is adjusted
every 2016 blocks ensuring that the Bitcoin network was
calculating 2
48
216−1 hashes in ten minutes on average. In
other words, given a mining difficulty D, the expected hash
rate H for the Bitcoin network to generate a new block is
H = D×2
48
(216−1)×10 mins .
Definition 2.4 (Block Interval). The block interval is the
interval between two blocks. According to the Bitcoin pro-
tocol, Bitcoin uses a 10 minute average block interval. That
means new blocks are generated every ten minutes [1].
Definition 2.5 (Mining Reward). The mining reward con-
sists of two parts: block reward and transaction fees, where
block reward refers to the first transaction in a block (i.e., the
coinbase transaction of a block) and transaction fees refer
to the slight difference between the total amount of inputs
and the total outputs of every non-coinbase transaction
included in a block. The mining reward encourages miners
to faithfully follow the Bitcoin protocol, from which the
security of the Bitcoin network is derived [1].
Definition 2.6 (Empty Block). The empty block is not
empty. An empty block is a block with only one transac-
tion, i.e., the coinbase transaction which allocates the block
rewards to the block creator.
Definition 2.7 (Mempool). The Mempool refers to a col-
lection of Bitcoin unconfirmed transactions. Each full node
in the Bitcoin network holds unconfirmed transactions at
local Mempool, and remove them once miners successfully
append them to the Bitcoin blockchain.
Definition 2.8 (Transaction Collection Strategy). The transac-
tion collection strategy refers to the mining pool’s strategy
for collecting unconfirmed transactions into a new block.
Many factors [25], [26] affect it such as waiting time, trans-
action size and transaction fees. We will further discuss the
transaction collection strategy in section 5.2.
2.2 Incentive Mechanism
An incentive mechanism [24], [27] is used to incent miners
to work only on valid blocks so that invalid ones will be re-
jected, and eventually do not exist in the Bitcoin blockchain.
Also, it attracts miners to continuously join and support
the Bitcoin network. Specifically, the miner who successfully
creates a new block is granted a certain amount of mining
rewards. As mentioned above, mining rewards are consisted
of a fixed amount of block rewards and the transaction fees
of a block. Note that block rewards start with a subsidy of
350 BTCs. But the subsidy of block rewards is designed to
be continuously halved after every 210,000 blocks (around
every 4 years) and will eventually reach zero BTC when all
21 million BTCs are minted. Till that time, mining rewards
will be only from transaction fees. We will further discuss
block rewards transition in section 4.3.2.
2.3 Pooled Mining Principles
Pooled mining principles normally consist of two parts:
share agreement and reward functions. The share agreement
[4], [24] means that all members of a mining pool work
together to mine a new block and share mining revenues
when any one of them successfully mines a new block. This
allows each member of the mining pool to receive relatively
stable mining rewards. The reward function [4] refers to the
approach of dividing mining rewards by the pool operator.
After completing the mining task, miners report their so-
lutions to the pool operator. If the Bitcoin network accepts
the solution, the operator collects the mining rewards and
divide it among miners following a specific reward function
such as PPS and PPLNS [28] that both parties agreed with
on beforehand.
3 MEASUREMENT SETUP
3.1 The Measurement Framework
Fig. 1 shows the measurement framework. In step a), we
ran several Bitcoin Full Node clients to synchronize real
time network traffics with other nodes in the Bitcoin net-
work through the Bitcoin protocol. We then identified two
types of data: historical transactions data and unconfirmed
transactions data, where historical transactions data means
transactions at the Bitcoin blockchain; and unconfirmed
transactions data means unconfirmed transactions at Mem-
pool. In step b) and c), we set up two MongoDB databases,
denoted by DB1 and DB2, to store historical transactions
data and unconfirmed transactions data, respectively. In
step d), most of the confirmed blocks with corresponding
mining pool labels can be obtained from data servers such
as the Blockchain.Info website and BTC.com. Finally, in step
e), we developed a python crawler to collect mining pool
Mempool
Bitcoin Full Node
DB1
.......
Historical
transactions
b)
DB2
.......
Unconfirmed
transactions
c)
MongoDB
Localhost
Bitcoin
peers
Bitcoin protocol
a)
Data
servers
Python crawler
e)
d)
Fig. 1. The Measurement Framework
TABLE 1
Block Processing Results
Category # of Blocks Proportion Time Span (mm/dd/yy)
Known pools 153,842 98.18% 02/25/2016 - 01/03/2019
Unknown pools 2,853 1.82% 02/25/2016 - 01/03/2019
* Total number blocks from 02/25/2016 to 01/03/2019 is 156,695.
TABLE 2
An Overview of Top 25 Bitcoin Mining Pools
Mining Pool Alias # of Blocks Time Span (mm/dd/yy)
AntPool? N/A 27,026 02/25/2016 - 01/03/2019
F2Pool? Discus Fish 19,282 02/25/2016 - 01/03/2019
BTC.com? Block Trail 17,488 09/05/2016 - 01/03/2019
ViaBTC? N/A 12,100 06/05/2016 - 01/03/2019
SlushPool Bitcoin.cz 12,002 02/25/2016 - 01/03/2019
BTC.TOP N/A 11,256 12/11/2016 - 01/03/2019
BTCC BTCC China 10,586 02/25/2016 - 09/25/2018
BitFury N/A 8,754 02/25/2016 - 01/02/2019
BW.COM† LKETC 7,315 02/25/2016 - 04/03/2018
Bixin N/A 5,048 06/12/2016 - 01/02/2019
BitClub N/A 4,563 02/25/2016 - 01/03/2019
unknown N/A 2,853 03/11/2016 - 01/02/2019
GBMiners† N/A 2,093 08/30/2016 - 04/15/2018
1Hash† N/A 1,895 03/04/2016 - 12/07/2017
KanoPool N/A 1,813 02/25/2016 - 12/27/2018
Bitcoin.com N/A 1,813 09/21/2016 - 01/02/2019
Poolin N/A 1,535 07/02/2018 - 01/03/2019
DPOOL N/A 1,199 03/31/2018 - 01/03/2019
KnCMiner† N/A 909 02/25/2016 - 09/12/2016
BTPOOL† N/A 703 06/15/2017 - 12/01/2017
58COIN N/A 694 11/05/2017 - 01/01/2019
Telco 214† Telcominer 653 02/27/2016 - 08/23/2017
WAYI.CN N/A 602 04/03/2018 - 01/02/2019
Huobi.pool N/A 578 04/12/2018 - 01/03/2019
BWPool N/A 517 04/03/2018 - 11/09/2018
* Total number blocks from 02/25/2016 to 01/03/2019 is 156695.
* N/A indicates the mining pool does not provide the corresponding data .
* The symbol ? indicates the top four major mining pools.
* The symbol † indicates the pool has no signs of activity for half a year.
* Time span represents first observation time and last observation time from
02/25/2016 to 01/03/2019.
labels from BTC.com to identify the block creator of each
confirmed block for further analysis.
During the progress of data processing, for those blocks
whose mining pool labels are available, we grouped them
into known pools, meaning that the block creators are
publicly known. Conversely, for those blocks whose mining
pool labels are unavailable, we grouped them into unknown
pools, meaning that the block creators are anonymous.
Specifically, the data processing results are shown in TA-
BLE 1. As we can see that 98.18 percent of block creators
are available and only 1.49 percent of block creators are
unavailable. The time span began on February 25, 2016,
for the following two reasons. First, the computing power
of the Bitcoin network increased dramatically and many
well known mining pools such as BTC.com, ViaBTC and
BTC.TOP started to appear after year 2016. Second, the
Bitcoin’s network computing power and market price [7]
increased dramatically over the period, meaning that Bitcoin
started to be popular among the public.
TABLE 2 shows an overview of top 25 Bitcoin mining
pools from February 2016 to January 2019. According to
BTC.com, there are many mining pools in the Bitcoin net-
4Algorithm 1: Unconfirmed Transaction Timestamp
Input : Each unconfirmed transaction (transaction id) at
Mempool.
Output: Each unconfirmed transaction (transaction id) at
Mempool, timestamped with the corresponding
observation time list.
1 while number of unconfirmed transactions at Mempool > 0 do
2 request the Bitcoin Full Node for each unconfirmed
transaction (transaction id) every two seconds;
3 if the unconfirmed transaction (transaction id) has not yet
been removed from Mempool then
4 update the observation time list for the unconfirmed
transaction (transaction id);
5 else
6 continue;
Algorithm 2: Block Processing Algorithm
Input : Each confirmed block (block id); The data server
BTC.com.
Output: Each confirmed block (block id), labeled with
corresponding mining pool label.
1 while number of confirmed blocks > 0 do
2 request the data server for each confirmed block (block id).
3 if successfully get the mining pool label for the confirmed
block (block id) then
4 update the mining pool label for the confirmed block
(block id);
5 else
6 label the confirmed block (block id) as ’unknown’;
work. We crawled blocks of mining pools and traced related
information such as alias, the number of blocks and time
span. In the following sections, we will focus on analysis of
top four minging pools, i.e., AntPool, F2Pool, BTC.com and
ViaBTC.
3.2 Challenges of Data Collection
Our data sets are grouped into two types: historical transac-
tion data and unconfirmed transaction data. The first type
of data is stored in the local Bitcoin blockchain. The second
type of data is obtained from real time network traffics
disseminated across the Bitcoin network. Algorithm 1 shows
the unconfirmed transaction timestamp algorithm. To solve
the problem of inconsistent system clocks of different nodes
in the Bitcoin network, we use the local system clock as
the standard clock. We ran the Bitcoin Core 0.14.2 with the
initial configuration of ’txindex=1’. Every two seconds, we
performed a full scan of unconfirmed transactions at local
Mempool using the ’bitcoin-cli getrawtransaction’ command,
and updated the corresponding observation time list. Once
an unconfirmed transaction is successfully collected by min-
ers, it will be removed from the Mempool. Thus, we locally
maintained an observant timestamp list for each verified but
not confirmed transaction at Mempool. Algorithm 2 shows
the block processing algorithm. We obtained the block cre-
ators of 156,695 confirmed blocks from February 2016 to
January 2019 via interacting with the data server BTC.com.
Similarly, to solve the problem of inconsistent system clocks
of block creators, we collected the timestamp that BTC.com
first observed a block, and used this timestamp to calculate
the block interval.
Three main challenges during the progress of data col-
lection and data processing. The first challenge is the prob-
lem of inconsistent system clocks of transactions (blocks)
creators as mentioned above, since nodes in the Bitcoin
network could have a different machine system clock value.
Our solution to the first challenge is to use a consistent
machine system clock as the standard system clock. For
unconfirmed transactions’ data, we used the local system
clock as the standard system clock, to calculate consistent
transaction delays for different transactions. For confirmed
blocks’ data, we used the BTC.com system clock as the
standard system clock, to calculate consistent block intervals
for different blocks. The second challenge is data collection
frequency. It means that we need to control the frequency
of accessing local Bitcoin Full Node Mempool when main-
taining the timestamp list for each unconfirmed transaction
in the Mempool. For example, a higher frequency means
a higher accuracy though a heavier cost of the data ac-
quisition. Algorithm 1 shows our solution to the second
challenge. To achieve a balance, we queried data every two
seconds that is sufficient to satisfy the needs of maintain-
ing the timestamp list for each unconfirmed transaction
in the Mempool. The third problem is data loss. Various
reasons such as network congestion and temporarily losing
connections with the remote servers could cause the data
loss problem. Algorithm 2 shows our solution to the third
challenge. Every time we failed to get responses about block
creator of a block; we will repeat requesting the remote
server of BTC.com five times. If it still failed, we will label
the block with a label of the unknown.
4 DATA ANALYSIS ON HISTORICAL TRANSAC-
TIONS
We are interested in mining pool behavior characteristics,
such as the evolution of mining pools, the computing power
distribution, mining revenue and block size. To under-
stand these characteristics, we will analyze labeled historical
blocks and transactions in this section.
4.1 Distribution of Computing Power
Driven by the Bitcoin incentive mechanism, mining pools
contribute a large amount of computing power to the Bit-
coin network. In the following section, we will dissect the
computing power distribution and the evolution of Bitcoin
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Fig. 2. An Estimation of Blocks Created by Mining Pools from Feb 25,
2016 to Jan 03, 2019
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Fig. 3. Daily Hash Rate of Top Mining Pools from Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 03, 2019
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Fig. 4. Daily Hash Rate Proportion of Top Mining Pools from Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 03, 2019
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Fig. 5. (a) Daily Block Proportion of Top Mining Pools from Feb 25, 2016
to Jan 03, 2019; (b) Daily Cumulative Block Proportion of Top 3 and Top
5 Mining Pools from Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 03, 2019
mining pools. Data of computing power can be estimated
based on the proportion of mining pool’s blocks to the Bit-
coin network’s blocks over a period of time [29]. Also, it can
be obtained from the data servers such as Blockchain.Info
and BTC.com [30], [31]. The advantage of the first method is
that pruned blocks do not affect minted block distribution.
4.1.1 Minted Block Distribution
Fig. 2 shows an estimation of blocks created by mining pools
from Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 03, 2019, where the block proportion
is calculated by dividing a specific mining pool’s blocks
by the Bitcoin network’s blocks over a period of time. We
found that over the 95.99 percent of the Bitcoin network’s
computing power is controlled by top 25 mining pools.
Also, Fig. 2 shows an interesting phenomenon that the Bitcoin
network relies heavily on a few distinct mining pools [29],
[32]. During the observation period, the top four mining
pools, i.e., AntPool, F2Pool, ViaBTC and BTC.com, created
48.44 percent of blocks; and top five mining pools, i.e.,
AntPool, F2Pool, ViaBTC, BTC.com and SlushPool, created
56.10 percent of blocks that has exceeded the 51% computing
power of the Bitcoin network.
To validate the phenomenon of computing power central-
ization appears at any time during the observation period,
we conducted experiments on block proportion for top min-
ing pools. Fig. 5. (a) shows block proportion of top 1, 2, ..., 5
mining pool. Fig. 5. (b) shows cumulative block proportion
of top 3 mining pools and top 5 mining pools. We found
that more than 33 percent of the Bitcoin blocks are created
by only top 3 mining pools entities every day. Similarly,
more than 51 percent of the Bitcoin blocks are created by
only top 5 mining pools entities every day. It means that
top 3 mining pools entities continuously controlled more
than 33 percent of daily computing power; and top 5 mining
pools entities continuously controlled more than 51 percent
of daily computing power.
The Security Concerns. Although the Bitcoin protocol itself
is purely decentralized, we found that the Bitcoin network
relies heavily on major mining pools; and a few top mining
pools entities continuously control most computing power
every day. Such a trend of computing power centralization
may raise security concerns such as the 51% attacks and
selfish mining attacks [24] if these top mining pools aligned
to create new blocks. Note that both 51% attacks and selfish
mining attacks are not just theoretical attacks. Many real
world cases had been observed in other blockchain applica-
tions such as Namecoin [33], [34], Zencash and Bitcoin Gold.
4.2 Hash Rate Distribution
The hash rate proportion is calculated by dividing the hash
rate of a specific mining pool by the hash rate of the Bitcoin
network over a period of time. Fig. 3 shows the daily hash
rate of top mining pools from Feb 25, 2016, to Jan 03, 2019.
For day t ∈ [1, 1004] when the hash rate of each mining
pool continues to rise, we denote it by stage S1. For day
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Fig. 6. The Unit Profit of Mining Power (i.e., Hash Rate) from Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 03, 2019
TABLE 3
Parameters of λ and c of the Hash Rate Model H(t) = eλt · ec
Mining Entities λ c R-square Adj R-sq
AntPool 3.561× 10−3 39.9462 0.8658 0.8657
F2Pool 4.429× 10−3 38.7316 0.8313 0.8311
ViaBTC 4.239× 10−3 39.1101 0.8403 0.8402
BTC.com 3.836× 10−3 40.0757 0.7966 0.7964
Bitcoin Network 4.042× 10−3 41.5198 0.9483 0.9483
t ∈ [1004, 1044] when the hash rate of each mining pool
began to decline, we denote it by stage S2.
We modeled the changes of the hash rate of mining pools
in the first stage S1 by applying a simple Malthusian model.
The Malthusian model is also called a simple exponential
growth model, which is an exponential model with a con-
stant growth rate. We denote time by t and the hash rate of a
mining pools at time t by H(t). We assume that the growth
rate of the hash rate is a constant growing rate. That is, the
hash rate H(t) at any given time t; changes to H(y + δt) at
time t+ δt, the growth rate λ at time t would be a constant
value λ = H(t+δt)−H(t)H(t)δt . Thus, based on the assumption, we
have λ = limδt→0
H(t+δt)−H(t)
H(t)δt by taking limit δt → 0 as
follows,
λ =
H ′(t)
H(t)
(1)
After solving the math differential equation (1), we can
model the hash rate H(t) of a mining pool at any time t as
given in equation (2), where λ is the constant growth rate
and c is a constant variable.
H(t) = eλt · ec (2)
To solve the variables in equation (2), we transform the
equation into ln(H(t)) = λx + c, and then use the Least
Square (LS) method to solve the variable λ and c. TABLE
3 shows the parameters of λ and c of the hash rate model
H(t) = eλt · ec. We found that as of stage S1, the Bitcoin
network hash rate grows exponentially over time. Similarly,
the hash rate of top mining pools grow exponentially during
the observation period. Specifically, the hash rate of the
Bitcoin network of stage S1 is H(t) = e4.042×10
−3 · e41.5198
and the hash rate of the AntPool of stage S1 is H(t) =
e3.561×10
−3 · e39.9462.
The Malthusian Trap. We found an interesting phenomenon
that mining pools are caught in a Malthusian trap [35],
[36], where an exponential growth of the hash rate does not
mean an increasing hash rate proportion of a mining pool.
On the converse, some mining pools’ hash rate proportions
are actually decreasing despite an exponential growth of
the hash rate. Fig. 4 shows the daily hash rate proportion
of top mining pools from Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 03, 2019.
Specifically, the hash rate proportion of AntPool dropped
from 28.29 percent at day one to 11.58 percent at day 1004.
Similarly, the hash rate proportion of F2Pool dropped from
26.29 percent at day one to 9.78 percent at day 1004, despite
an exponential growth in the hash rate. We will further
analyze the mining revenue and the prisoner’s dilemma
among mining pools in section 4.3.1, where we could find
that mining pools are stuck in a Malthusian trap where there
is a stage at which the Bitcoin incentives are inadequate for
feeding the exponential growth of the computing resources.
4.3 Mining Revenue
The mining revenue is highly affected by Bitcoin market
price and block reward transition. In this subsection, we will
discuss the market price, block reward transition and their
effects on mining pools. We developed a simple revenue
model for mining pools. Assuming that the unit cost of
computing power is a constant value denoted by υ. And
mining pools are rational, meaning that when mining activ-
ities are profitable mining pools will increase the hash rate.
When mining activities are not profitable mining pools will
decrease their hash rate. Let t = 1 be Feb 25, 2016. We denote
mining revenue of a given day t by R(t), mining rewards
of a given day t by W (t) and the Bitcoin market price of a
given day t by M(t). Note that the mining rewards W (t)
consist of two parts: transaction fees and block rewards.
The transaction fees can be obtained by querying local
blockchain data set. The block reward of a given blockid can
be calculated according to the Bitcoin protocol as follows,
50× (1/2)b blockid210000 c (3)
Assuming that both the mining rewards function W (t)
and the market price function M(t) are continuous func-
tions. Thus, given any time t1 and t2, the net mining profit,
denoted by Net, can be calculated as follows,
Net(t1, t2) =
∫ t2
t1
R(t)− υ ·H(t)dt (4)
where the mining rewards R(t) = W (t) ·M(t).
If we take ∆t = t2 − t1 as a dairy datum. Then R(t) is
the average value of mining revenue per day and H(t) is
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Fig. 7. Daily Mining Rewards, Market Price and Mining Revenue from Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 03, 2019
TABLE 4
Game of Prisoner’s Dilemma Among Two Mining Pools A and B
Mining Pool A
Increase Unchanged
Mining Pool B Increase
(
α(1+ε)
α(1+ε)+β(1+ε) ,
β(1+ε)
α(1+ε)+β(1+ε)
) (
α
α+β(1+ε) ,
β(1+ε)
α+β(1+ε)
)
Unchanged
(
α(1+ε)
α(1+ε)+β ,
β
α(1+ε)+β
) (
α
α+β ,
β
α+β
)
the average value of the hash rate of mining pools per day.
Thus, we have the net profit of a mining pool of day t given
as follows,
Net(t) = R(t)− υ ·H(t) (5)
where R(t)H(t) means the unit profit of hash rate. When υ ≤
R(t)
H(t) , it means that mining activities for mining pools are
profitable and mining pools will increase their hash rate.
And when υ > R(t)H(t) , it means that mining activities for
mining pools are not profitable and mining pools will not
increase their hash rate.
We used our model to explain mining revenues of min-
ing pools and the hash rate evolution. Fig. 6 shows the unit
profit of mining power (i.e., R(t)/H(t)) from Feb 25, 2016 to
Jan 03, 2019. We found that when t = 1004, the unit profit of
mining power dropped to a low value around 1.5×10−13, of
which hash rate of top mining pols began to decline in order
to avoid further decline in unit profit of mining power. But
when the hash rate of mining pools drops to a certain low
value, the competitiveness of mining is weakened, and the
unit profit of mining power will increase again. For example,
on day 1034 the unit profit of mining power rebounded to
2.3× 10−13.
An interesting phenomenon is shown by combining Fig. 3
and Fig. 6 When day t ∈ [661, 1004], unit profit of mining
power is declining but the hash rates of mining pools are
still growing exponentially. For example, for AntPool, the
unit profit of mining power dropped from 4.02 × 10−12 of
day 661 to 0.15 × 10−12 of day 1004, but the hash rate of
AntPool is still growing exponentially. We are interested in
this phenomenon and propose a simple model based on the
game theory as shown in TABLE 4.
4.3.1 Game of Prisoner’s Dilemma among Mining Pools
In order to analyze the phenomenon as shown in Fig. 6
from day 661 to day 1004, where unit profit of mining
power is declining but the hash rates of mining pools are
still growing exponentially. We propose a simple model as
follows. Suppose two mining pools A and B with initial
computing power of α and β, respectively. Assume each
mining pool increases its computing power at a growth rate
ε where ε ≥ 0. Each mining pool is rationally driven by
incentive mechanism and maintains their existing market
share by investing computing power to keep up with Bitcoin
mining market. In our setting, two possible actions are
considered: increase in computing power or keep comput-
ing power unchanged. According to the pay off matrix
as shown in TABLE 4, the outcome of this game will be(
α(1+ε)
α(1+ε)+β(1+ε) ,
β(1+ε)
α(1+ε)+β(1+ε)
)
because this is the optimal
strategy for each individual mining pool and no one has the
motivation to change their strategy, although the ideal out-
come for both A and B is
(
α
α+β ,
β
α+β
)
. To better understand
the game of prisoner’s dilemma among mining pools, we
consider the following scenarios:
• If mining pool A chooses to increase its computing
power at a rate ε, then mining pool B will also
increase its computing power at a rate of ε or even
higher, since B’s mining revenue will drop from βα+β
to βα(1+ε)+β if it does not increase its computing
power.
• If mining pool A chooses to keep computing power
unchanged, then mining pool B will also choose to
increase its computing power in this case at a growth
rate of ε, since B’s mining revenue will increase from
β
α+β to
β(1+ε)
α+β(1+ε) .
Thus, regardless of whether mining pool A increases
or keeps its computing power unchanged, mining pool
B will always increase its computing power. Due to the
symmetry of the pay off matrix, mining pool A will also
increase its computing power regardless whether mining
pool B increases its computing power or not. Therefore,
if mining pools are not cooperatively mining in a pool
(see section 4.1.1), the final outcome of the game will be
8TABLE 5
All Two Events of Halving Block Rewards in the Bitcoin Network (until
Jan 03, 2019)
Time
(mm/dd/yy)
Mining Rewards (BTCs) Market Price
(USD)
Mining Revenue
(USD)Block rewards Transaction fees
11/28/2012 7,972 33.8 12.35 98,872
11/29/2012 4,174 30.7 12.45 52,349
07/09/2016 3,086 46.6 649.96 2,036,064
07/10/2016 1,914 38.3 649.03 1,267,101
(
α(1+ε)
α(1+ε)+β(1+ε) ,
β(1+ε)
α(1+ε)+β(1+ε)
)
, which results in a fact that
even if mining revenues of mining pools decrease, game of
computing power among mining pools are still fierce.
4.3.2 Block Rewards Transition
Bitcoin provides two incentives for miners: block rewards
and transaction fees. The block reward dominates the in-
centive mechanism in the early days of the Bitcoin network.
With the halving of block rewards, the transaction fees will
gradually increase its proportion in the incentive mecha-
nism. The assumption of Bitcoin is that no matter miners
are paid by block rewards or transaction fees, it will not
affect the Bitcoin incentive mechanism, and will not further
affect the security of the Bitcoin network [37]. In this part,
we are interested in the block reward transition and how it
effects on mining revenue.
Fig. 7 shows the daily data of mining rewards, Bitcoin
market price and mining revenue from Feb 25, 2016 to
Jan 03, 2019. We found an interesting phenomenon that the
transaction fees and Bitcoin market prices are not sensitive
to the event of halving block rewards. To be specific, TABLE
5 shows all two events of halving block rewards in the
Bitcoin network. For the most recent event of halving block
rewards, we can see that transaction fees slightly decreased
from 46.6 BTCs on July 9, 2016 (GMT), to 38.3 BTCs on July
10, 2016 (GMT). Similarly, market price slightly decreased
from $649.96 on July 9, 2016 (GMT), to $649.03 on July 10,
2016 (GMT). For the first event of halving block rewards
on November 28, 2012 (GMT), it also shows the similar
phenomenon in the block reward transition.
Concerns on the Block Reward Transition. The incentive
mechanism including block rewards and transaction fees,
contributes to the network security. According to the origi-
nal design [1], Bitcoin block rewards will eventually be cut
half to zero. Until that time, the incentive mechanism will
entirely rely on transaction fees. An implicit belief of the
original design is that whether miners are rewarded with
block rewards or transaction fees, will not affect the security
of the Bitcoin network [37].
Our measurement results show that both transaction fees
and Bitcoin market prices are not sensitive to the block
reward transition. As shown in Fig. 7 and TABLE 5, both
transaction fees and market prices, cannot compensate for
the half of block rewards. We suggested that a relatively
stable incentive mechanism is of great importance to the
security of the Bitcoin network, especially in a real world
market where Bitcoin price is fluctuating.
4.4 Block Size
Block size is important to the Bitcoin performance [38]. The
maximum throughput of the Bitcoin network is constrained
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Fig. 8. Block Size of Mining Pools from February 25, 2016 to January 3,
2019
TABLE 6
Empty Block Rates of Mining Pools from February 25, 2016 to January
3, 2018
Mining Pools
Entities
Bitcoin
network AntPool F2Pool ViaBTC BTC.com
The empty block rate 1.01% 1.98% 0.65% 0.26% 1.31%
by block size and block interval [26]. For example, a block
size of 1 MB can support a maximum throughput of 3.3 to 7
transactions per second. Given the importance of block size,
in this part we will explore the block size of different mining
pools, with particular interest in the empty block analysis.
Fig. 8 shows the block size of mining pools from Feb
25, 2016 to Jan 3, 2019. We found that the block size of top
mining pools is around 1 MegaByte (MB). For example, the
average block size of AntPool is around 0.81 MB. And the
average block size of BTC.com is around 0.90 MB.
Fig. 8 also shows an interesting phenomenon that mining
pools prefer 1 MB blocks to 2 MB blocks even though mining
pools support a maximum block size of 2 MB following the
Bitcoin improvement proposal 102 on November 11, 2015.
For example, 95 percent of AntPool’s blocks are less than
1.14 MB; 95 percent of F2Pool’s blocks are less than 1.15 MB;
95 percent of ViaBTC’s blocks are less than 0.95 MB and
95 percent of BTC.com’s blocks are less than 1.23 MB. We
are interested in why mining pools with the capability of
generating the 2 MB block, perfer to generate 1 MB blocks.
More analysis about transaction and block propagation will
be discussed in section 5.1.
Reasons for Empty Blocks. We are interested in reasons for
empty blocks. As shown in TABLE 6 where empty block
rates of different mining pools from February 25, 2016,
to January 3, 2019, are presented. The first reason for the
empty block is that the cost of mining an empty block
is much less than the cost of mining a non-empty block
since the block interval of an empty block is much shorter.
Specifically, as shown in Fig. 10 where block intervals of
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Fig. 10. Block Intervals of Empty Blocks and Non-Empty Blocks from
Feb 25, 2016 to Jan 3, 2019
empty blocks and non-empty blocks from Feb 25, 2016 to
Jan 3, 2019 are presented. An interesting phenomenon is that
block intervals of empty blocks significantly less than block
intervals of non-empty blocks. On average, block intervals
of empty blocks are around 1 minute while block intervals
of non-empty blocks take around 9.6 minutes on average.
It indicates that generating empty blocks can significantly
reduce block interval compared to generating non-empty
blocks. Thus, following our model in section 4.3, the net
profit of mining an empty block is given in equation (6) and
the net profit of mining a non-empty block is in equation (7)
as follows,
Netempty(t1, t2) =
∫ t2
t1
Rempty(t)− υ ·H(t)dt (6)
Netnon−empty(t1, t3) =
∫ t3
t1
Rnon−empty(t)− υ ·H(t)dt
(7)
where the net profit of mining an empty block
Netempty(t1, t2) is greater than the net profit of
Algorithm 3: Empty Block Generating Algorithm
Input : the latest block header (required), the last full block
(optional).
Output: New empty block(s) or non-empty block(s).
1 New Block Candidate1: start mining new empty blocks after
receiving and verifying the last block header;
2 New Block Candidate2: start mining new non-empty blocks after
receiving and verifying the last full block;
3 if Block time of Candidate1 < Block time of Candidate2 then
4 generate empty block(s);
5 else
6 generate non-empty block(s);
mining a non-empty block Netnon−empty(t1, t3) when
Rnon−empty(t) ≈ Rempty(t) and t2 − t1  t3 − t1. The
second reason is that for some mining pools, the progress
of mining an empty block starts before getting the full block
data as shown in Algorithm 3. This means mining an empty
block can cut the time of receiving the full block data as well
as the time of verifying all transactions of the block. More
analysis based on block propagation time will be further
discussed in section 5.1.
Empty Block Concerns. Even though some people may
argue that mining an empty blocks has no monetary ad-
vantages to those who mine non-empty blocks since empty
blocks do not include transaction fees. Our measurement
results show that the block intervals of empty blocks are
significantly lower than the block intervals of non-empty
blocks. It indicates that the cost of mining an empty block
is significantly lower than the cost of mining a non-empty
block. Especially when the transaction fees are so low that
the net profit of an empty block is higher than the net profit
of a non-empty block, empty blocks attract mining pools.
However, high transaction fees are not attractive for the
Bitcoin users. And empty blocks also harm users. Empty
blocks result in relatively high transaction delay since empty
blocks waste the transaction processing capability of the
Bitcoin blockchain.
5 DATA ANALYSIS ON UNCONFIRMED TRANSAC-
TIONS
Mining pools receive announcements of verified uncon-
firmed transactions from Bitcoin clients in the Bitcoin net-
work, and get some transaction fees from these transactions
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Fig. 11. Transaction Delay of Mining Pools from March 6, 2018 to
January 3, 2019
to be included in the new block. In this section, we are
interested in several properties of unconfirmed transactions
such as the transaction delay and transaction collection
strategy of mining pools.
5.1 Transaction Delay
Fig. 9 shows the process of broadcasting transactions and
blocks data across the Bitcoin network. In step (a), peer A
creates a new transaction named tx1 and peer B creates a
new transaction named tx2. And these new transactions tx1
and tx2 are verified and stored at local Mempool, since they
have not been confirmed yet. In step (b), peer A broadcasts
the unconfirmed transaction tx1 to neighbor peers B and
C. Similarly, peer D broadcasts the tx2 to neighbors peers B
and C via the Bitcoin protocol. After transaction verification,
peers B and C store these unconfirmed at local Mempool. In
step (c), peer B collects unconfirmed transactions tx1 and
tx2 from local Mempool, and include them into a new block
named bn. In step (d), peer B broadcasts the new block bn
to neighbor peers A and C via the Bitcoin protocol. After
block verification, peers A and C delete tx1 and tx2 from
local Mempool since they have been confirmed by block bn.
Transaction delay is the delay between the first time we
observed an unconfirmed transaction, and the first time we
observed that the transaction was written into a block. Bit-
coin blocks are designed to be generated every ten minutes
on average. The mining difficulty is dynamically adjusted
depending on the time it took for solving previous blocks.
Thus, the Bitcoin transaction delay should be around five
minutes on average. In this part, we are interested in the
transaction delay in the real world Bitcoin network.
Fig. 11 shows the transaction delay of mining pools from
Mar 6, 2018 to Jan 3, 2019. We found that transaction delays
vary widely. The longest transaction delays of mining pools
could be a week or even longer during the observation
period. But these transactions account for a very small
proportion. For most of the transactions, the transaction
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Fig. 12. Acceptance rate of local top-X transactions with the highest
feerate from March 6, 2018 to January 3, 2019
delays are relatively shorter. For example, 90 percent of
AntPool transactions delayed in 32.37 minutes and 33.6
percent of AntPool transactions delayed in 5 minutes. Other
top mining pools such as F2Pool, ViaBTC and BTC.com also
show the similar experimental results.
5.2 Transaction Collection Strategy
The transaction collection strategy is the strategy adopt by
mining pools for collecting unconfirmed transactions into a
new block. Several factors such as transaction size, transac-
tion fee and waiting time, effect the transaction collection
strategy. In this part, we are interested in the transaction
collection strategy [39], [40] for mining pools.
We proposed a simple model to analyze the the transac-
tion collection strategy. Assuming mining pools are rational.
The goal of the mining pool is to maximize its mining rev-
enue. Thus, given a subset of n unconfirmed transactions,
each transaction i has a transaction fee pi and a transaction
size wi. The maximum block size is c. In particular, xi = 1
means that mining pool chooses to collect transaction i;
otherwise, xi = 0. Thus, we have the model as given
in equation (8). A solution to the model is the greedy
algorithm. Mining pools pick the unconfirmed transactions
with the largest feerate (i.e., the ratio of transaction fee and
transaction size), and it can get an approximate solution to
the maximum mining profit.
maximize
n∑
i=1
pixi
subject to
n∑
i=1
wixi ≤ c
xi ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, ..., n}
(8)
Validation. To detect the transaction collection strategy
of mining pools and validate the importance of feerate in
transaction collection strategy, we developed a python tool
11
for analyzing local Mempool unconfirmed transactions. Our
methods are as follows. First, we sorted the local Mempool
unconfirmed transactions according to their feerate in a
descending order. Second, we picked top-X unconfirmed
transactions from Mempool and constructed a data set of
size X , where X is the number of transactions of the next
block. Third, we validated how many transactions of uncon-
firmed transactions are collected into the next block by min-
ing pools and analyzed the properties of these unconfirmed
transactions. Also, we introduced a new metric named the
acceptance rate to describe the effectiveness of the feerate
strategy. For example, if the acceptance rate is 100 percent,
it means 100 percent of the unconfirmed transactions are
collected by mining pools. Otherwise, if the acceptance rate
is 0 percent, it means none of the unconfirmed transactions
are collected by mining pools. Through this approach, we
can dissect the transaction collection strategy of different
mining pools.
Fig. 12 shows the acceptance rate of Mempool top-
X unconfirmed transactions with the highest feerate from
Mar 6, 2018 to Jan 3, 2019. We found that the feerate is
a dominating factor in the transaction collection strategy.
Specifically, for AntPool, the acceptance rate of the uncon-
firmed transactions could be 89.46 percent on average if its
feerate ranks are in top X , On the converse, the acceptance
rate of the unconfirmed transactions could be less than 3.81
percent if its feerate ranks are out of top 2×X . Other mining
pools such as F2Pool, ViaBTC and BTC.com also show the
similar experimental results.
6 RELATED WORK
6.0.1 Bitcoin Network Measurements
There are many existing works focus on the Bitcoin net-
work. These measurement studies can be classified into
two categories: network protocol analysis and network flow
analysis.
First, in terms of network protocol analysis, Gervais
et al., [41] proposed that the adversary can exploit mea-
surements in order to effectively delay the propagation of
transactions and blocks to specific nodes for a considerable
amount of time without causing a network partition. They
also suggested some countermeasures in order to enhance
the security of the Bitcoin network. Yonatan et al., [42]
investigated the implications of having a higher transaction
throughput on the Bitcoin security against double spending
attacks. They also showed that at high throughput, sub-
stantially weaker attackers are able to reverse payments
they made even well after they were considered accepted
by recipients. Kiffer et al., [43] studied the large scale
fork in the blockchain network and showed how the fork
lead to unintentional incentives and security vulnerabilities.
Toyoda et al., [44] identified Bitcoin addresses related with
fraudulent activities such as high yield investment program
by analyzing transactions patterns, and showed that about
83% of fraudulent activities addresses are correctly classified
while maintaining false positive rate less than 4.4%. Croman
et al., [26] analyzed the performance bottlenecks of the
Bitcoin protocol and suggested that parameters of block size
and block intervals was the first increment toward achieving
high local blockchain protocols. Chen et al., [45] presented
a novel design statechain which used Bitcoin blockchain
to propagate application log, enabling application nodes
to efficiently query the log as well as tranfer log between
blockchains. Luu et al., [46] proposed a novel protocol
design for a decentralized mining pool, which incurs mining
fees lower than centralized mining pools and is designed to
scale to a large number of miners. Owenson et al., [47] intro-
duced a proximity-aware extension to the Bitcoin protocol
to improve the transaction propagation delay in the Bitcoin
network by clustering nodes based on their membership.
Neudecker et al., [48] presented a simulation environment
based on the Bitcoin network since computing power of
the Bitcoin network are too huge to conduct real world
experiments.
Second, in terms of network flow analysis, Joan et al.,
[49] proposed a data collection process identifying more
than 872,000 different Bitcoin nodes from which they pre-
sented the size of the Bitcoin network, the node geographic
distribution and the network stability in terms of inter-
rupted availability of nodes. Sallal et al., [50] measured
transaction delay and analyzed transaction data propaga-
tion and considered data inconsistency of different nodes
in the Bitcoin network. Qin et al., [51] provided a research
framework to explore the economic issues in the Bitcoin
ecosystems from the levels of mining pools, individual
miners and blockchain network. Chen et al., [52] conducted
a measurement study on the Ethereum blockchain network
by leveraging graph analysis to characterize three major
activities namely money transfer, smart contract creation
and smart contract invocation.
6.0.2 Mining Pool Measurements
An interesting topic in the Bitcoin network is mining pool
measurements. Mining pools are major computing resources
and significantly impact on both security and performance
of the Bitcoin network. There are many measurement stud-
ies based on the Bitcoin mining pools, including network
flow analysis [31], incentive mechanism and mining com-
petition [3], [4], [32], [53], [54]. Specifically, Wang et al.,
[31] studied the Bitcoin network flows and presented the
evolution of Bitcoin mining pools by conducting a case
study on F2Pool. Arthur et al., [32] showed that vital op-
erations and decisions that Bitcoin is currently undertaking
are not decentralized, and showed that third-party entities
can unilaterally decide to devalue any specific set of Bit-
coin addresses pertaining to any entity participating in the
system. Lewenberg et al., [3] focused on mining rewards
distribution of the Bitcoin mining pools and showed that
under high transaction loads, it is difficult or even impos-
sible to distribute rewards in a stable way. Schrijvers et al.,
[4] introduced a game theoretic model for reward functions
within a single Bitcoin mining pool and showed that PPLNS,
a popular reward function, is incentive compatible in a more
general model. Zamyatin et al., [53] formulated a model of
the dynamics of a queue based reward distribution scheme.
They showed that the underlying mechanism disadvantages
miners with above-average hash rates. Liu et al., [54] studied
the dynamics of mining pool selection in a blockchain
network, where mining pools may choose arbitrary block
mining strategies. They demonstrated the stability in the
evolution of miners’ strategies in a general case.
12
7 CONCLUSION
This paper presented a thorough measurement study on
the Bitcoin network. We traced over 1.56 hundred thousand
blocks (including about 257 million historical transactions)
from February 2016 to January 2019 and collected over
120.25 million unconfirmed transactions from March 2018
to January 2019. We then conducted an in-depth investiga-
tion of the Bitcoin network from a perspective of mining
pools. We have shown that a few mining pools contin-
uously control most of the computing resources of the
Bitcoin network. We found that mining pools are caught
in a prisoner’s dilemma where mining pool competes to
increase their computing resources even though the unit
profit of the computing resource decreases. And mining
pools are stuck in a Malthusian trap where there is a stage at
which the Bitcoin incentives are inadequate for feeding the
exponential growth of the computing resources. Moreover,
we conducted a large scale measurement and analysis on
Mempool unconfirmed transactions and found that feerate
plays a dominating role in transaction collection strategy
for most of the top mining pools. In summary, the results
of this study provide a comprehensive picture of the inside
working of the Bitcoin network.
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